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STUDENT ARTICLES
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND ABORTION PROTESTS:




Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed
or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period.
- Thornhill v. Alabama
310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)
(emphasis added).
I. INTRODUCTION
Laws composed by humans are never perfect. Human life
is sufficiently complicated that any general governmental
requirement or prohibition will admit of exception, and no
matter how equitable a law is in general, there will be situations
in which it is less than equitable for it to be applied.' Valid
restrictions on the applicability of generally equitable laws are
often discovered, brought to light by particularly perplexing
cases.' We intend to show here that the activities of Operation
Rescue make evident the need to qualify the legitimate rights
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Covenant College 1987; J.D., University of Notre Dame 1991; Thomas J.
White Scholar, 1989-91.
** B.A., Philosophy, Covenant College 1982; M.A.R., Westminster
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1. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 143-45 (1137a32-1138a3)
(Hackett ed. 1985); ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1370-72 (1373bl-1374b24)
(Random House ed. 1941).
2. For example, not every homicide is a murder. Exceptions are made
for self-defense, accidents and insanity. In these cases, the person doing the
killing would be found not guilty of murder.
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protected by criminal trespass statutes. Accordingly, the thesis
of this paper is two-fold: (1) to show that as the statute is pres-
ently applied, Operation Rescue activities which conform to the
stated intentions of their organizers constitute "justifiable"
civil disobedience; and (2) to provide an amendment to the
criminal trespass statute which would make the law sensitive to
the overriding rights and duties involved in situations sharing
the features highlighted by Operation Rescue activities. Estab-
lishing this two-part thesis is divided into three sections. The
first section covers several preliminary considerations concern-
ing the moral foundation for the application of particular laws,
civil disobedience in general, rights relating to informed moral
choice and the characteristics of Operation Rescue as ideally
conceived. The second section briefly outlines the proposed
amendment. Finally, the third section defends the claim that
the proposal is justified as a matter of constitutional law, sound
public policy objectives and rational thought.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Concerning the Grounds on Which Laws Are Justified
Laws can be usefully divided into two classes: first, there
are laws which prohibit or require actions which independent
moral considerations also prohibit or require.' Second, there
are laws which are not also moral matters4 and are purely mat-
ters of expedience.5 It is a moral failure to set fire to your chil-
dren, and laws are enacted to provide civil and criminal
sanctions for such behavior. Clear examples of laws of expedi-
ence are less obvious, but many traffic laws fall into this
category.6
3. This corresponds to actions which are generally referred to as
"malum in se" ("evil in itself").
4. This refers to actions which are "malum prohibitum" ("wrong
because it is prohibited").
5. Some advocates of Utilitarianism recognize only one class of laws.
See generally J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST
(1973) (identifying the moral with the expedient, and thus concluding that
this amounts to a distinction without a difference). An identification of this
sort, however, is a simplification that ignores common sense opinion. It may
very well be that all actions which are truly expedient are also morally
permissible, but it is difficult to see how this could be proven. Most would
agree that sometimes the morally correct thing to do is not what is expedient.
6. In fact, there is essentially a continuum between matters which are
purely moral and purely expedient. Laws against exceeding 65 miles per
hour, for example, fall towards the expedient end of the continuum even if
not a matterpurely for expedience. In the absence of such a law, we would not
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The distinction between laws based in morality and those
based (purely) in expedience, although hard to apply in some
cases, is important when arguments are offered concerning the
change of an existing statutory provision. For laws based
purely in expediency, a change can usually be justified by pro-
viding a persuasive indication that the altered, as altered, law
would be more expedient. For example, the decision to allow
right turns on red lights does not depend for its justification on
a demonstration that, contrary to the existing (unqualified) law,
turning right on red is really morally permissible. For laws
based even in part on moral considerations, however, argu-
ments for change must address both morality and expedience.
While the argument of this paper would be greatly simpli-
fied if laws regarding trespassing were merely matters of expe-
dience, such is not the case. Trespass laws have a foundation in
both moral considerations and in expedience. Similarly, with
Operation Rescue activities several moral concerns are
involved, and so both expediency and moral arguments are
required. Arguments against amending the criminal trespass
statute in response to Operation Rescue activities only need to
show that such activities are either productive of more harm
than benefit, or that they are morally offensive, or that such
amendment is violative of the U.S. Constitution. Thus if our
amendment is to be justified, we must show that Operation
Rescue activities are neither harmful nor morally objectionable,
and that the amendment is in accord with the Constitution. We
will establish each of these premises, but while arguments
about expedience require little introduction, a number of intro-
ductory comments are required concerning arguments about
the morality of an action.
If it were possible, the easiest way to settle disputes about
the moral status of an action would be to give a detailed
account of what it is for an action to be moral or immoral, and
then to show that the action in question possessed the neces-
sary and sufficient qualities to count as one or the other.
Accounts like this are available, but they are either overly sim-
plistic and counter-intuitive, or overly general and impractica-
ble.7 Consequently, it is necessary to consider instead how it is
think that the presence of a speed limit sign would make driving faster than
65 miles per hour a moral failure.
7. See generally J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 7 (Bobbs-Merrill rev. ed. 1957)
(identifying the morally right with that which produces the greatest amount
of pleasure-known as the "hedonic" utilitarianism). See also G. MOORE,
PRINCIPIA ETHICA 147 (Cambridge rev. ed. 1965) (identifying the morally
right with that which produces the greatest amount of "goodness"). Moore
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that we come to know that a particular action is morally right or
wrong. In this regard, we will consider two qualities that
actions can possess which indicate their moral value. Since
moral rightness is considerably more complicated than moral
wrongness, we will further limit our analysis to moral
wrongness.
The two qualities which an action can possess, either of
which would indicate that the action is morally wrong are
(a) that the action is on balance harmful either to the
individual or to others, or
(b) that the action is offensive to human moral
sensibilities.
Each of these deserves comment.
First, we can come to know that an action is wrong if it can
be shown that the action is on balance harmful when all its
effects have been weighed. This is sufficient to show that the
action is morally wrong. It is necessary to include the "all
effects have been weighed" qualification, because many morally
laudable actions are harmful in the short term (e.g. cutting off
someone's arm is harmful in itself, but if it is done in order to
prevent the spread of a life-threatening infection the action is
not harmful "on balance"). Various utilitarian calculi can be
employed to assess the overall harmfulness of an action; all of
them have limitations, but usually it is possible to reach some
agreement about the fact of overall harmfulness, even if its
extent is much harder to calculate.8 It should be noted that
although overall harmfulness is a sufficient indicator of moral
wrongness, overall benefit is not a sufficient indicator of moral
rightness. For example, to kill a person suffering from a conta-
gious disease may produce a preponderance of benefit to all
those spared by not contracting it, but that would not make
such a killing morally right.
The second indicator of moral wrongness (being morally
offensive)9 is included for two reasons. First, on balance
admits that his account is all but impossible to apply, and Mill's account is
consistent with startling conclusions about just punishment.
8. For an account of the difficulties attending calculations of this sort,
see G. MOORE, id. at 149-57.
9. We are assuming that all those addressed by the argument possess
very similar moral sensibilities, i.e. that any two likely readers, if presented
with the same simple description of an action, would experience similar
reactions to it. This was a nearly unquestioned assumption in 18th century
moral philosophy (Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Thomas Reid and
Immanuel Kant all took it for granted), but the diversity of moral opinion
today might make it seem less plausible. In spite of this diversity, we believe
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harmfulness is not a necessary feature of morally wrong actions
(for example, the desire to kill another is morally wrong, but it
is not clear that it is harmful unless it is acted upon).' The
second reason moral offensiveness needs to be included is that
in many cases it is the awareness of offensiveness that registers
the clearest charge against the action. Often it is the pre-reflec-
tive reaction of offense, an immediate sense that something is
not right, that encourages us to consider the harmfulness of an
action. Without this perception of moral wrongness, many
truly harmful actions might go unanalyzed. This is not to say
that we are justified in holding an action to be morally wrong
only if we show that it is on balance harmful. Some actions
which produce neither a surplus of benefit nor a surplus of
harm are nonetheless known to be morally wrong because they
are offensive. "
Moral offensiveness, however, is difficult to analyze. In
order to justify our contention that Operation Rescue activities
are not morally offensive we will employ two different methods
of analysis, hoping that the concurrence of the two will provide
sufficient evidence for our conclusion. The methods will be
those of the intuitionist moral philosophers (particularly W.D.
Ross and H.A. Prichard) 2 and of the rationalists (Immanuel
Kant and Alan Gewirth).' While it is not certain that these
that the assumption can be defended though we do not intend to offer a
defense of it here. See generally Reid, Essays on the Active Powers, in 3 WORKS OF
THOMAS REID 154-72 (Duyckinck, Collins, Hannay & Bartow rev. ed. 1822).
10. See, e.g., W. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 72-73 (1930). See also
J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 96-7. Williams' example ofJim and
Pedro the jungle despot (Jim must choose between killing one child himself
or watch as Pedro kills fifty) is an example in which the action which
minimizes harm is too offensive to be entertained.
11. For example, a person with high self-esteem may not be harmed by
an insult, but the insult is offensive even though not productive of harm.
12. W. Ross, supra note 10, at 1-15; Prichard, Does Moral Philosophy Rest
on a Mistake?, 21 MIND 487 (1912). While they would certainly differ with
Prichard and Ross concerning moral ontology (what it is for an action to be
wrong), eighteenth century Moral Sense philosophers such as Hutcheson and
Reid represent a very similar strategy with regards to moral epistemology
(what it is to know and how it is that we come to know whether an action is
right or wrong).
13. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Macmillan
rev. ed. 1959); A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978). The Rationalist
camp has many other members, including Plato and John Locke. Kant and
Gewirth will be focused upon because of the central place they give to
universalizability as a requirement for true moral judgments. See also R.
HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963); Baier, Moral Reasons, in MIDWEST
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 62 (1978); and S. DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON
(1983).
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philosophers would agree with our conclusion, we do think that
their methods can be fairly and consistently marshalled to sub-
stantiate our thesis. The Intuitionist analysis relies on the
claim that in considering an action humans are directly
"struck" by moral characteristics involved in it. These direct
"perceptions" regard "prima facie"' 4 rights and duties involved
in the action. For example, we all acknowledge a prima fade
duty to keep promises, i.e. we are aware of strong reasons to
act so as to keep the promise. If an action involves the viola-
tion of a promise, such an action is prima fade wrong. If no
other rights or duties are involved, then the action is wrong
simpliciter.
The difficult cases are when more than one right or duty is
involved (as with Operation Rescue activities). In these cases a
judgment must be made as to which of the various prima facie
concerns is of overriding importance. Both Ross and Prichard
would assert that in such situations, although the matter may
require carefully considering the details of the case, one of the
prima face rights will take precedence over the other. In com-
plex cases, there is often disagreement about whether an action
is offensive; this is usually because people differ about which of
the various legitimate concerns should take precedence.
Usually the judgment that an action is offensive is made
without reflection: people see or contemplate an action and
then respond. People are capable, however, of amending their
appraisal after the fact as a result of reflection. As we will dis-
cuss below, 5 the most crucial element in the initial reaction-
judgment is the description under which the action is judged.
If, after reflection, it is clear that the overriding right has been
violated, then there is sufficient reason to believe that the
action is morally wrong. We contend that, under the appropri-
ate description, Operation Rescue activities uphold rather than
violate the most important rights involved in the Operation
Rescue context.
The rationalist strategy which we employ assumes that an
action is morally right (in the absence of laws to the contrary)
only if the principle upon which the action is based can be uni-
versalized. For example, suppose you are contemplating slan-
dering an associate because she stands in the way of your own
advancement. In spreading the lies you would be acting on the
principle (Kant would call it a "maxim") "I ought to slander my
14. Darwall uses "presumptively" to mean essentially the same thing.
S. DARWALL, supra note 13, at 86.
15. See infra at 1035-36.
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associates when it enhances my chance for advancement." The
universalized form of this principle would be "Everyone ought
to slander all those who threaten their chances for
advancement."
Rationalists insist that you should see that such an action
must be morally wrong either because you would not be willing
that everyone else should act on that principle (since this
means that others would be slandering you for their own bene-
fit) or because a world in which everyone slandered everyone in
their way would be a world in which no one would trust anyone
else and there would be no such thing as advancement at all. 6
Ultimately all of these rationalist strategies (commonly referred
to as "universalizability tests") depend on looking hard at the
situation with a particular question in mind ("What is the over-
riding consideration here?" or "Is the principle on which the
action is based universalizable?") and having the answer strike
you with some sort of intuitive force.
In many cases, an action may offend our moral sensibilities
simply because we know it to be a violation of existing law. To
a certain extent, when someone breaks the law we are offended
by the disrespect which such behavior shows for the wisdom of
those who made the laws; or because the actor is asserting that
the law need not apply to herself; or because the action is seen
as an attack on the stability of society. Whatever the reason, we
are uneasy with disrespect for the law, and in the absence of
reason to believe otherwise, willful violation of the law exhibits
this sort of disrespect.
There are, however, circumstances in which our propen-
sity to be offended by such actions is at least suspended, for
example, if we are aware that the actor is driven by extreme
need. Another example is when the action is performed to
influence a change in the law itself. In either of these cases, the
violation of the law is not usually considered offensive as an
16. In a very simplified form this is the method common to both Kant
and Gewirth. The primary formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative is
crucial to the conclusion in this example: Act only on that maxim which can
at the same time be willed as a universal law. I. KANT, supra note 13, at 39.
Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency (the supreme principle of
morality) commands that everyone "Act in accords with the generic rights
(freedom and well-being) of your recipients as well as yourself." The basic
point is that we are rationally obliged to promote and not impede the
voluntary and purposive activity of others. A. GEWJRTH, supra note 13, at 135-
50.
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instance of law-breaking. 7 If it is found to be offensive, it will be
for other reasons.
Frequently Operation Rescue activities are defended as
actions in violation of the law, but justifiable because of the
need which another (the fetus) has for protection. For those
not convinced that there is another interested party in the case,
this is not a sufficient reason to suspend judgment. Despite
that, Operation Rescue activities can still be defended as
instances of civil disobedience. If it can be shown that Opera-
tion Rescue activities constitute morally justifiable acts of civil
disobedience, then those offended by such activities primarily
as violations of law should have sufficient reason to reconsider
their appraisal.
B. Concerning Civil Disobedience
In order to consider Operation Rescue activities as
instances of civil disobedience it is first necessary to give a gen-
eral definition of civil disobedience, outlining the characteris-
tics which an action must have in order to qualify as civil
disobedience. In his discussion on civil disobedience, John
Rawls provides a helpful summary of some essential
characteristics:
a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act con-
trary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a
change in the law or policies of the government. 8
According to this definition, there are five characteristics which
an action should possess if it is to be regarded as civil disobedi-
17. When people break the law as part of, and for the purpose of changing
the law, whether or not we are offended by the action is not a function of our
reaction to the act as an act of lawlessness. Rather, it is a function of our
agreement or disagreement with them in their purpose to change the law. If
we sympathize, and the lawlessness is proportionate to the message, then we
will react to the action as an instance of message delivery. If we do not
sympathize, then we may be offended even by proportionate disobedience-
but it will be offense at both the message and the act as message delivery.
18. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 364 (1971). Rawls' definition was
chosen for this discussion because his account of civil disobedience is one of
the least permissive accounts available and thus provides a stern test. We are
assuming that actions that conform to his definition would be admitted easily
by others' definitions. For example, the model proposed by Dworkin is
particularly permissive. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
184-96 (1977) (arguing that citizens have a right to exercise "fundamental
rights" in accord with their consciences even in ways contrary to legislative
mandate). The models proposed by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Gandhi are
similarly more permissive than Rawls'.
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ence (as opposed to conscientious refusal' 9 or militant defi-
ance).20 First, the action must violate an existing statute or
legal rule. Second, the action must be performed at least par-
tially with the purpose of altering existing laws or policies.
2'
(The law violated by the action need not be the law or policy
the action intends to affect. We will refer to these two laws as
the "violated law " and the "targeted law.") Third, the actions
must be accompanied by some attempt to explain the purpose
of the actions to those capable of affecting a change in the
existing laws or policies. 22 Fourth, the action must be nonvio-
lent, such that no actual threat to the physical safety of others is
essential to the action. Finally, the action must be undertaken
"within the limits of fidelity to law ... [and with] the willing-
ness to accept the legal consequences of [the action]." '23
These features are highlighted for two reasons. First, we
are concerned to emphasize that Operation Rescue activities
constitute genuine instances of civil disobedience rather than
being instances of militant defiance. To the extent they do not
deviate from their stated policies, Operation Rescue activities
meet all of these requirements. Second, breaking the definition
down in this fashion facilitates our consideration of the extent
to which the law ought to change as a result of such activities.
The change in law advocated in this note is not a change in
the law that Operation Rescue activists are seeking to effect as a
result of their activity (indeed, effecting a change in law is not
their primary purpose). 4 Moreover, it is not our intention to
19. An example of conscientious refusal would be omitting a required
action, such as refusing to pay income taxes because the money may be used
to support a war.
20. An example of militant defiance would be blocking the entrance to
a government building and actively preventing people from entering.
21. The action need not have affecting an alteration in law as its
primary purpose. Those who protested racial segregation policies by using
restricted washroom facilities did not serve only the purpose of suggesting
change by their activities.
22. Since Rawls crafts his definition only for the case of a democracy,
this characteristic is expressed by his inclusion of "public" in the definition.
The assumption is that the action must be performed with the majority as the
audience, those empowered to effect an alteration. See J. RAWLS, supra note
18.
23. This is part of Rawls' gloss on the "nonviolent, conscientious"
requirement in the definition. SeeJ. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 366.
24. One of the primary purposes of Operation Rescue is to dissuade
pregnant women from having an abortion. The proposal we are advocating
here calls for a qualification on the prohibition against trespass in order to
facilitate the efforts of people who wish to provide information necessary for
the making of a fully informed choice.
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argue that Operation Rescue activities are in fact morally per-
missible in spite of the fact that the law presently forbids it.
Rather, it is our contention that if there were no law forbidding
their use of private property in the way they do, then there
would be no grounds upon which to find their actions morally
impermissible. 5
In the preceding section we indicated that laws of prohibi-
tion for matters not purely regarding expedience must have a
foundation either in the harmfulness or the moral offensiveness
of the actions being forbidden. With these two possible foun-
dations in mind it is possible to distinguish "justifiable" civil
disobedience from that which is "unjustifiable." "Justifiable"
instances of civil disobedience are those which satisfy the five
requirements detailed above, 6 as long as the violated law, in
being applied to the actions involved, forbids actions which are
neither harmful nor morally offensive. Many of the activities
associated with the civil rights movement of the 1960s qualified
as "justifiable" civil disobedience according to this definition.
In the case of those which made non-violent use of racially
restricted facilities, the violated law and the targeted law hap-
pened to coincide. What made the activities inoffensive was
not primarily the fact that the targeted law lacked moral foun-
dation, but rather the fact that the violated law lacked such a
foundation. If it had been the lack of foundation of the
targeted law which made the actions inoffensive, then many
other laws could have been violated to convey their message,
and the disobedience would still have qualified as "justifiable."
For example, if activists had attempted to change laws which
restricted the use of drinking fountains by destroying the foun-
tains set aside for whites only, the groundlessness of the laws
providing the restrictions would not have been sufficient to jus-
tify the acts of destruction.
When the violated law lacks appropriate foundation (i.e. in
"justifiable" civil disobedience) some change in the law is justi-
fied. This change can take one of two forms, depending on the
extent of the defect in the law. If the law is based on a mistaken
understanding of the rights of individuals (as with laws regard-
ing racial segregation), then the law should be abandoned.
This is not what is at issue regarding the violated statute in
Operation Rescue civil disobedience.
25. This part of the thesis is qualified because it is not necessary to
argue for any more than this regarding the moral acceptability of the
proposal itself.
26. See supra at 1002.
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Although a statute may not be based on a mistaken prem-
ise, it may also be defective by being excessively general, and
thereby extend prohibitions beyond the justifying foundation
of the more general statute. Laws with this defect need to be
amended rather than abandoned. It is our contention that laws
concerning criminal trespass possess this defect and that for
this reason an amendment is necessary. This is not a particu-
larly radical suggestion. Laws are frequently amended pre-
cisely because their original formulations need to be general
and cannot normally address each of the unusual situations
which will stretch the limits of their generality. Moreover, as
we will discuss below, laws concerning criminal trespass should
themselves be qualified, particularly with regard to the nature
of the trespass involved in the Operation Rescue context. 7
While it is true that in the Operation Rescue context the
violated statute and the targeted statute do not coincide, it is
important not to allow convictions about the justifiability of the
targeted statute (laws concerning access to an abortion) to
cloud the issue. At issue is the foundation for the violated stat-
ute, the specific application of the criminal trespass laws to the
actions of Operation Rescue participants, not as Operation
Rescue participants per se, but more generically construed, i.e.
as providers of significant information regarding a health care
choice. Although we do not attempt to consider this case apart
from claims highly specific to the Operation Rescue context,
this context provides only the occasion for our analysis of the
criminal trespass statute.2 s
C. Concerning Rights Relating to Informed Choice
Before looking at the complications which the Operation
Rescue context provides to the substance of the analysis, it is
important to reflect on the high priority that ought to be given
to the right to make informed moral choices. Rational beings
possess the ability to make choices between genuine alterna-
tives; they can weigh the reasons for and against a particular
course of action and act upon what they perceive to be the
weightier reasons. This ability is so central to the conception
of free and responsible choice that if a choice is made in the
absence of reflection on reasons for alternatives there is reason
to be reluctant to call it a choice for which the actor was
27. See infra at 1011-12.
28. This being the case, the proposed change in the trespass laws could
be applied to benefit labor unions, Communists or members of the Ku Klux
Klan, provided they met the criteria of the proposal.
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"responsible." For example, if a driver swerves to miss a ball
that is thrown into the road and plows over a row of mailboxes
it is ordinarily wrong to say that she chose to destroy the mail-
boxes. In addition to reflection, however, responsible choice
involves at least some knowledge concerning the reasons for
the alternatives: an uninformed choice is not a responsible
choice either.
A certain amount of caution is necessary here, however,
since the word "responsible" in this context can have two dif-
ferent meanings. First, "responsible" can mean "involving
accountability," in which case choices are either "responsible"
or they are not. A choice made by a person in a psychotic state
would be irresponsible in this sense. Second, "responsible"
can mean "faithfully fulfills obligations." Some choices can be
"responsible" in the former sense without being "responsible"
in the latter. When our parents told us to act responsibly they
did not intend that we merely act on the basis ofjust any infor-
mation; they more likely intended that we act on the informa-
tion (for the reasons) which they taught us to consider
significant. To avoid this potential ambiguity, we will use
"responsible" in the first sense, and use "commendable" for
the second. Commendable actions, in this sense, are those
actions which are based on a thorough consideration of the var-
ious reasons the actor might have had for and against perform-
ing it. Thoroughness in this context is not simple to define,
and will depend upon how much time the actor has to consider
options and the extent of the actor's knowledge of the options.
Choices made while purposefully refusing to consider relevant
factors cannot be regarded as commendable actions.
With this distinction in mind, our next step will be to
demonstrate that moral agents have an obligation to make
choices which are as commendable as is reasonably possible
(when a choice is required). Moreover, this obligation on the
part of the chooser implies that others have both a right, and,
in some situations, an obligation to assist the chooser (without
violating the chooser's freedom in choosing) when making a
commendable choice. Alan Gewirth's analysis of rational
agency is helpful for establishing this claim, and it runs as fol-
lows:2" rational agency is impossible unless the agent pos-
sesses two characteristics: voluntariness and well-being.
29. See generally A. GEWIRTH, supra note 13, at 58-63 (The heart of his
argument is that these provisions must be rights for everyone, because if they
are not, moral agency is not possible for anyone. Since moral agency is
evidently possible, these must be rights.)
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Because of this, Gewirth concludes the following: first, that the
agent has a right to have the conditions of voluntariness pre-
served and where possible augmented;" ° second, this right
implies that others have a moral obligation to safeguard and
where possible augment the conditions of the agent's volunta-
riness; and third, everyone ought to safeguard and where possi-
ble augment the conditions of any agent's voluntariness.
As a consequence of this third conclusion, it can be
derived that the agent herself has an obligation to safeguard,
and where possible augment, the conditions of her own agency.
Thus, every agent has an obligation to make a choice which is
as commendable as is reasonably possible when a choice is required.3 '
Since the absence of knowledge of considerations relevant
to a choice is sufficient to render a choice significantly involun-
tary, it is evident that one of the conditions of voluntariness is
the possession of at least some knowledge of the relevant con-
siderations.3 2 Furthermore, any increase in the agent's knowl-
edge of relevant considerations contributes to an increase in
the conditions of voluntariness for the agent. Consequently,
both the agent and others in a position to assist her have an
obligation to seek to increase the relevant information which
the agent possesses regarding the choice.
Consider the following example: Smith and Jones are
alone in the Chemistry lab eating lunch. Smith wants to put
salt on his sandwich, but he doesn't have any. Smith's knowl-
edge of Chemistry extends far enough for him to know that salt
is composed of sodium and chloride, and seeing bottles of each
available he figures that mixing them will produce salt. 33 Jones
sees what Smith is about to do, and realizes the potentially
30. It also implies a right to well-being, but since that feature of the
agent is not essential to our argument we will not make mention of it along
with voluntariness. It should, however, be assumed.
31. While this may appear to be an excessively perfectionist
implication, it is important to stress that since we have at least some obligation
to be careful in making choices, it is reasonable to say that we have an
obligation to make the choice as commendable as time and resources allow.
For example, it is a failure to make choices based on what you know to be
unfair prejudices or unreliable information.
32. "Relevant consideration" is a bit hard to define precisely in this
context, but we are assuming that relevant considerations are all those that
could motivate the agent to make a particular choice. This definition is very
similar to what Stephen Darwall would call "reasons for a person to act." See
S. DARWALL, supra note 13, at 78-82.
33. Simply mixing sodium and chloride, however, will not produce salt.
Rather, the sodium would combust when swallowed, and have a potentially
lethal effect if ingested in this manner.
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deadly consequences of swallowing such a mixture. Does Jones
have any obligation to assist Smith with information relevant to
what Smith is about to do? Although Jones could probably not
be held legally responsible 4 if he does nothing, the fact
remains that so long as Jones can do something to warn Smith
at little cost to himself, Jones would be quite lacking in concern
for the well-being of Smith not to make some attempt. Both
lacking normal human sympathy for others and acting as if one
lacked such sympathy are moral failures.3 5 Failing to assist
Smith at little cost to himself would be a moral failure on Jones'
part.
It should be noted that Jones' obligation in this matter
amounts only to his attempting to give Smith the necessary infor-
mation. If Jones tells Smith to stop and listen for a moment
and Smith pulls his hat over his head, then Jones will have ful-
filled his obligation (at least regarding information). Thus, the
general obligation on the part of others is to safeguard and
attempt to augment the conditions of others' agency; while for
the agent the obligation is to safeguard and augment the condi-
tions of agency. If it is granted that obligations imply rights,
3 6
then Jones has the right, as well as the obligation, to attempt
such assistance.
The illustration with Smith and Jones can further be used
to indicate factors which bear on the urgency of the obligation
(and therefore the defeasibility of the right). Three factors are
particularly significant. First, the urgency of the obligation to
assist with information is greater to the extent that Jones (the
"informer") has reason to believe that Smith (the agent) lacks
the information. Second, the urgency of the obligation on the
informer is greater to the extent that the informer has reason
to believe that the agent would find the information relevant to
the choice. In the illustration these two are closely tied
together, but it is possible that only one of the two factors
would come into play.
The third factor that bears on the urgency of the obliga-
tion on the informer is the proximity of the agent to the
moment of actually completing the process of deliberation.
34. See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (1962).
35. See, e.g., F. HUTCHESON, ILLUSTRATIONS ON THE MORAL SENSE
(1971); D. HUME, ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
(Schneewind rev. ed. 1983).
36. The relationship between duties and rights is a morass all its own
into which we do not wish to wander at this point. See generally W. Ross, supra
note 10, at 48-55 (defending the move from an obligation which implies
rights to a correlative right).
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The urgency is greater the closer the agent is to this "moment
of truth." The process of deliberation about a course of action
begins with the awareness that a choice is required and ends
with an action beyond which an alternate choice is impossible. With
some choices this point is easier to identify than with others.
Usually, however, it is possible to determine whether a particu-
lar process of deliberation is still incomplete. The relevant
issue is whether it is still possible for the agent to choose more
than one alternative course of action. In the criminal law con-
text, this is what is known as the "locus poenitentiae," or the
"chance afforded to a person, by the circumstances, of relin-
quishing the intention which he has formed to commit a crime,
before the perpetration thereof."
3 7
Since it is possible to form an intention to choose one of a
number of alternatives without having the process of delibera-
tion end with that as the choice, there is a discernible difference
between the formation of an intention to act and the final
choice in the matter. We will refer to this interval between
intention formation and completion of the choice as the
"extremity" of the process of deliberation. It should be noted
that the obligations to augment the conditions of agency are
still in force up to the completion of the choice in the final act,
and thus the fact that the agent has formed an intention about a
choice does not release either the agent or the informers from
their obligations concerning information relevant to the choice.
In fact, the obligation, especially on the informer, is most
urgent when the agent is in the extremity of the process of
deliberation.
D. Concerning the Intended Character of Operation Rescue
Operation Rescue, although essentially a confederation of
various pro-life organizations,3 8 refers to itself in its literature
as an "event" rather than an organization.39 Coordinated
nationally by Randall A. Terry, the founder and executive
director of Project Life, Operation Rescue advocates a series of
sit-in "rescues" organized under a common vision which
regards their actions as "intervening on behalf of the baby and
the mother."4 By "mother," Operation Rescue advocates are
referring to pregnant women approaching abortion clinics to
37. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1090 (4th ed. 1951).
38. See Join Us In Operation Rescue 5 (1988) (pamphlet stating the official
policy and practice of Operation Rescue) [hereinafter Join Us].
39. Id. at 1.
40. The New American, Nov. 7, 1988, at 19.
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get an abortion, and the "baby" refers to the fetus she is
carrying.
Terry indicates the short-term goal of Operation Rescue as
stopping as many abortions as a direct result of the "rescues"
as possible, and the long-term goal as being a constitutional
amendment prohibiting abortion.4 ' Additionally, Operation
Rescue literature identifies goals of "changing public opinion
to prevent abortion," creating a "wave of righteous uprising,"
and "obeying God's command." 4
Operation Rescue coordinators recognize the importance
of having the events be "unified, peaceful, and free of any
actions or words that would appear violent or hateful to those
watching on T.V. or reading about it in the paper."" To this
end the activists are required to read and pledge in writing to
abide by explicit rules for on-site participation.44 In general,
the rules require participants to "co-operate with the spirit and
goals of the event," "commit to be peaceful and non-violent in
word and deed," ". . . not struggle with police in any way, but
remain polite and passively limp," and let "appointed individu-
als" do the talking with media, police, and women seeking
abortion while "singing and praying with the main group."4 5
It is further important to note what is not approved by Oper-
ation Rescue. Pledging "non-violence in word and deed"
would negate any endorsement of assault on people or destruc-
tion of property including blatant violations of the pledge such
as bombing abortion facilities or attacking doctors. To the
extent these things do happen, Operation Rescue does not
"take responsibility or inwardly rejoice."46 For the purposes of
this article, the practices of Operation Rescue will be evaluated
as they are ideally conceived. Specifically, "non-violence" will
be recognized as the absence of any physical damage to per-
sons or property. The proper means of bringing this about are
best illustrated in the words of an Operation Rescue advocate
as "preventing the death of babies by fully informing the
mothers of the consequences of the abortion."
41. Id. at 20.
42. See Join Us, supra note 38, at 2.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 5.
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III. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO CRIMINAL TRESPASS STATUTES
From state to state there is little variation in the language
and effect of the general laws against criminal trespass. For
purposes of this article the statute targeted for amendment will
be the Model Penal Code section 221 .2," appropriately titled
"Criminal Trespass." While the Model Penal Code prescribes
no specific penalty, the penalty for violation of the Indiana law
against criminal trespass is typical of the penalty in other juris-
dictions: a class A misdemeanor carrying a sentence of a maxi-
mum of one year in jail, a $5,000 fine, or both.4"
We propose that states retain the language of their current
criminal trespass statutes with the following amendment:
The Criminal Trespass statute is not violated if:
1) no physical contact with unconsenting persons is
initiated,
2) no physical damage to property is involved,
3) the property is
a) a health care facility, and
b) publicly accessible,
4) the otherwise unprivileged entry does not
a) go beyond the entrance into the facility, and
47. Criminal Trespass:
(1) Criminal Trespass Defined. A person is guilty of criminal
trespass if, without privilege to do so, he purposely enters or
remains in:
(a) any building or occupied structure, or separately secured
structure or any portion thereof; or
(b) any other place as to which notice against trespass is given.
Notice may be given by posting in a manner proscribed by
law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders, as well as by actual communication to the actor.
(2) Grading. Criminal trespass is a violation, except that it
constitutes a petty misdemeanor if:
(a) the actor breaks into any building or occupied structure, or
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, or
(b) the intrusion is in a building or occupied structure and the
intruder knows that discovery of his presence would under
the circumstances cause apprehension for the safety of
person or property.
"Break into" means to enter by force, intimidation, deception, or trick, or by
any unauthorized use of a pass key or any device for intruding in secured
premises, or through an opening not designed for human access.
48. IND. CODE § 35-50-3-2 (1988).
Class A misdemeanor. A person who commits a class A
misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than
one (1) year; in addition, he may be fined not more than five
thousand dollars ($5,000).
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b) occur during any time when the facility is closed to
the. general public,
5) the activity on the property bears upon a practical
health choice which
a) is manifestly in its extremity, and
b) involves the provision of information necessary for
a fully commendable completion of the choice, and
6) the information provided is reasonably believed not to
be in the possession of the person making the choice.
Definitions:
1) A "practical health choice" is the voluntary selection
of a course of action intended to directly affect the
physical or psychological well-being of the person
making the choice.
2) A practical health choice is "manifestly in its extrem-
ity" when there is convincing evidence that the person
has formed the intention to act in a particular manner
but has not yet physically brought the intention to
completion.
3) A "fully commendable practical health choice" is one
in which the person, upon careful reflection, is una-
ware of prejudice or partiality; and one in which the
.person has made a good faith effort to seek out and
not to ignore information potentially related to the
facts of the situation, the options involved, and the
likely consequences of those options.
4) Information is "essential to a fully commendable prac-
tical health choice" if it concerns either the facts of the
situation facing the person making the choice, or the
options available, or the likely consequences of those
options.
While this particular amendment may intrude upon the
rights of certain parties, such intrusion does not offend the fed-
eral Constitution. Furthermore, by decriminalizing only non-
violent activity which provides needed information, the amend-
ment facilitates the often stated government objective of mak-
ing consumers aware of the implications of their decisions.
Finally, this narrow qualification on the absolute prohibition
against trespass provides for more good than potential harm,
and does not offend common sensibilities in a democratic
society.
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IV. JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROPOSAL
A. The Proposal Is Reasonable and Constitutional
The amendment to state criminal trespass statutes pro-
posed in section II149 raises a number of constitutional issues,
particularly as applied to Operation Rescue activities in front of
abortion clinics. Operation Rescue participants' rights to free
speech, clinic owners' due process and .property rights, and
womens' rights to choose an abortion are all constitutionally
protected to a certain degree. In determining whether the pro-
posal is constitutionally valid and judicially prudent, each of
these rights must be examined and balanced"° in relation to
each other. Additionally, because only a state's criminal laws
are affected, it is particularly important to determine whether
the public's interest in protection through criminal laws impli-
cates constitutionally protected rights.
1. No Private Constitutional Interest in Criminal Laws
The proposal puts a narrow range of trespass activity
beyond the state's authority to impose criminal sanctions. A
person wishing to challenge the constitutionality of such an
amendment would most likely allege a violation of a constitu-
tional right, and seek a remedy under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.51 To come within the provisions of section
1983, a person (in this case, either the clinic owner or pregnant
woman) would claim that the state, as parens patriae, failed to
protect either the property or the right to choose an abortion,
thus causing a deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."' 52 In general, however, federal courts have
49. Hereinafter referred to as "the proposal."
50. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980),
discussed infra at 1016-17; Freedman, Press Passes and Trespasses: Newsgathering
on Private Property, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1305, 1334-42 (1984). Both
suggest that when rights of free expression interfere with the rights of others,
the interests of parties affected should be balanced rather than denying free
expression altogether.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The statute states in pertinent part:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 'regulation,
custom, or usage, of any state . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured ......
52. U.S. CONST.. amend. XIV, § 1 (the Due Process Clause), applied in
Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052
(1985).
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been reluctant to recognize a due process right to protection by
the state.53
The leading Supreme Court case regarding state protec-
tion as a due process right is DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services.' In DeShaney, the Court stated at
the outset of the opinion that the Due Process Clause
forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, lib-
erty, or property without 'due process of law,' but its lan-
guage cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative
obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do
not come to harm through other means .... Its purpose
was to protect the people from the state, not to ensure
that the state protected them from each other.55
The majority further emphasized that the due process clause
does not entitle private citizens to governmental assistance,
"even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty or
property interests of which the government itself may not
deprive the individual."5 6
Prior to DeShaney, the Supreme Court had avoided ruling
explicitly that there was a due process right to protection
through criminal laws, but nevertheless excluded sources of
state liability in cases alleging a constitutional violation under
section 1983.5' Federal circuit courts, however, have specifi-
cally refused to recognize protection by the state through its
criminal laws as a constitutional right.
In Bowers v. DeVito,58 for example, the Seventh Circuit dis-
missed the section 1983 claim of a woman killed by a person
known by state officials to be dangerous. Judge Posner, writing
for the majority, held that the state was not constitutionally
obliged to protect citizens from private violence, stating that
"[tihe Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the
state to let people alone; it does not require the federal govern-
53. See, e.g., Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-23 (1st
Cir. 1986); Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1481-82
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982);
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 109 S. Ct.
998 (1989).
54. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
55. Id. at 1003.
56. Id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (no
obligation to fund abortions or other medical services)); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (no obligation to provide adequate housing).
57. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
58. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
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ment or the state to provide services, even so elementary as
maintaining law and order."1
5 9
The plaintiffs in Bowers and DeShaney based their section
1983 claims on the premise that the state has a constitutional
obligation to use its police power to criminally sanction certain
behavior and protect citizens from danger. The Bowers Court
clearly rejected this premise in stating:
[T]here is no constitutional right to be protected by the
state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It
is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents
against such predators, but it does not violate the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or we sup-
pose, any other provision of the Constitution.
60
Bowers and DeShaney involved what appeared at first glance
to be a state's deprivation of life without due process of law. It
would indeed be "monstrous," as Judge Posner states in Bow-
ers, for a state to withhold its police power to deny protection
against murderers. Nevertheless, to do so would not offend the
Constitution.
The proposal similarly appears to be a state deprivation.
Rather than involving an apparent deprivation of life, the pro-
posal affects property by affording less state protection to
property owners when their property is imposed upon in a par-
ticular way. However, for the same reasons stated in Bowers and
DeShaney, the proposal's narrow qualification on laws against
criminal trespass does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.
Rather than withholding protection from murderers, the
proposal would merely deprive the state of authorization to
prosecute non-violent trespassers engaged in a narrowly-
defined activity on limited portions of private property. Since
only criminal trespass is affected, civil trespass remedies would
remain. In this regard, the proposal is far less "monstrous"
than the scenario envisioned by Judge Posner in Bowers, and
furthermore serves to enhance freedom of expression.
2. Proposal Implicates a Clash of Constitutional Claims
When Operation Rescue participants assemble at an abor-
tion clinic, several constitutional values are implicated. By
voicing their opposition to the policy of legalized abortion and
informing women about negative consequences of, and possi-
59. Id. at 618.
60. Id.
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ble alternatives to, undergoing the procedure, the Operation
Rescue participants exercise their first amendment right to free
speech.6' Besides free speech rights, the proposal may impli-
cate other constitutional interests, such as a woman's right to
choose an abortion,6" the clinic owners' right under the fifth
amendment to be free from having his property taken without
just compensation,6" and the right of both these parties to "be
let alone."'  The clash between the Operation Rescue partici-
pants' free speech interests and these other claims, however,
suggests that a narrowly limited privilege to trespass be cre-
ated, rather than allowing for no privilege at all.65
a. Free Speech Versus Privacy, Due Process and Freedom From
Uncompensated Takings
By removing criminal penalties from a specific range of
trespass activity, the proposal would effectively permit the lim-
ited use of private property without the owner's consent. Such
use would be confined to expressive activity by Operation Res-
cue participants or any other person meeting the criteria of the
proposal, thus promoting free speech. Whether this consti-
tutes a "taking" of the clinic owners' property in violation of
the fifth amendment was answered in the negative by a unani-
mous Supreme Court in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins.66 In
addition to the "takings" issue, the Court in Pruneyard affirmed
that a state could permit, in some circumstances, the uncon-
sented use of private property without violating the due pro-
61. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This provision states in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... " This
guarantee also applies to the states as incorporated by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision states in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall private property by taken for public use without just
compensation ...... This guarantee applies to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
64. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)
(referring to Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1980) (Court
balanced interests of demonstrators with interests of property owners to
decide that certain speech, within limits, was protected on some private
property under state constitution); Freedman, supra note 50, at 1328-42
(arguing in favor of a newsgathering privilege on private property based on a
balancing of the interests involved).
66. 447 U.S. 74, 78 (1980).
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cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. 67 Furthermore,
while Justice Powell's concurrence in Pruneyard suggested that
permitting the same activity on private residential property
might be an unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy, 8
such an exception would not invalidate the proposal.
1) Fifth Amendment Considerations. In Pruneyard, the Court
noted that the right of a property owner to exclude others is
one of the "sticks" in the "bundle of property rights," and that
limiting that right through state regulation technically
amounted to a "taking" of that right.69 Nevertheless, the Court
went on to rule that not every government action limiting prop-
erty rights constitutes a "taking" in violation of the Constitu-
tion.7" The Court established a balancing test in holding that a
state's limitation on the right to exclude would constitute a
"taking" only when it is sufficiently "essential to the use or eco-
nomic value of their property .... ""
Whether a state's restriction on the right to exclude
impairs the economic value substantially enough to be a "tak-
ing" will frequently depend on whether the restriction is tem-
porary or permanent. For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CA TV Corp., the Supreme Court held that a law
authorizing a permanent physical occupation of property, how-
67. Id.
68. 447 U.S. at 100 n.4 (Powell, J. concurring).
69. Rather than phrasing the guarantee of free speech as a right the
state may not abridge, the California Constitution uses language providing
affirmative rights to free speech. The California Supreme Court, in Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854, aff'd 447 U.S. 74 (1980), held that this state guarantee of free expression
exceeded the protection of the federal Constitution, and granted persons the
right to use privately-owned shopping centers for non-disruptive speech
activities. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that California was free to adopt
statutes or constitutions granting individual liberties more expansive than the
federal Constitution. 447 U.S. at 81.
As precedent, Pruneyard would be highly persuasive as authority to limit
property rights in favor of free speech rights in the forty-four states where
free speech guarantees in the state constitutions are linguistically similar to
California's in that affirmative freedoms are granted. See Meyer, Assuring
Freedom of the Student Press After Hazelwood, 24 VAL. U.L. REV. 53, 71 n.1 13
(1989), for a complete list of these forty-four state constitutional provisions.
70. 447 U.S. at 82.
71. Id. at 84. The plaintiff, the owner of a shopping center, alleged that
since the California Constitution permitted a group of students to use the
property to gather signatures for a petition, there was necessarily a "taking"
of his right to exclude. The Court, however, noted that the presence of the
students only marginally interfered with the commercial function of the
shopping center, and so the right to exclude them did not have a significant
economic value. Id. at 83.
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ever slight, constituted a per se taking.72 Conversely, the Loretto
Court also stated that the validity of temporary physical occu-
pations would be determined by a balancing of the parties'
interests.
73
An example of a temporary restriction, particularly analo-
gous to the proposal, is illustrated in State v. Shack.74 In Shack,
the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the criminal trespass
convictions of a social worker and an attorney who had entered
a migrant worker camp, without the owner's consent to give
legal advice and provide health services. The Court first con-
ceded that the farmer-employer was entitled to pursue his
farming activities without interference. 75 Nevertheless, this
right could not be extended to allow the farmer to deny the
workers the opportunity to receive aid and information avail-
able from groups seeking to assist them. 76 The Shack Court
further noted that due to the "disadvantaged" state of the
migrant workers, their need for legal and health services was
much greater than the mainstream of the community. 77 Conse-
quently, it would be inappropriate to punish efforts to reach
them.
2) Fourteenth Amendment Considerations. In addition to the
fifth amendment, property owners are protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 78 In Pruneyard, a
shopping center owner alleged that state laws permitting pri-
vate persons to use his property for expressive activity violated
the due process clause.79 In rejecting this argument, the Court
stated that the fourteenth amendment requires only that the
law "not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
objective sought to be obtained."8
The proposal grants an avenue for affirmative free speech
rights as the means for meeting the objective. The objective-
to provide information necessary for making fully commenda-
ble health choices-relates directly to the means by decriminal-
72. 458 U.S. 419, 432-35 (1982).
73. Id.
74. 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
75. 58 N.J. at 307, 277 A.2d at 374.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 303, 277 A.2d at 372.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause provides in
pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."
79. 447 U.S. at 84.
80. Id. at 85 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)).
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izing trespass only at places and times where such information
is likely to be needed. The reasonableness of the proposal will
depend on 1) the extent of a state's obligation to protect pri-
vate property,"' and 2) the balance of the interests of the
affected parties.
82
3) Privacy Considerations. Finally, property owners may
argue that the proposal violates their constitutional privacy
rights.8" The strength of this argument will largely depend on
the purpose and accessibility of the property. While several
cases have indicated that privacy interests in one's home are
substantial enough to override first amendment claims, 4 the
holding in Pruneyard suggests that private property held open
for business to the public involves an expectation of privacy
which must yield to state guarantees of free expression.
b. Free Speech Versus Rights to Privacy and a Choice Regarding
Abortion
Besides conflicting with property and privacy interests of
the clinic owners, the proposal affirms free expression values in
a manner which may affect the liberty interests of the clinics'
patients and potential patients. In the context of women
approaching an abortion clinic in order to terminate a preg-
nancy, the proposal's effect of facilitating the free expression
rights of Operation Rescue participants poses a clash between
the speakers' interests and 1) the privacy interests of unwilling
listeners,85 and 2) the right of a woman to choose to terminate
her pregnancy free from unjustified state interference. s6
Although the clash in the former instance is normally resolved
in favor of the speakers,8 7 there are instances when the privacy
81. See supra at 1017-18.
82. See infra at 1022-27.
83. Although no specific provision of the Constitution affirms a right to
privacy, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
recognized a general right to privacy within the "penumbra" of rights
enumerated in the Constitution.
84. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (right to
broadcast offensive speech outweighed by privacy interests in the home);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (right to broadcast "loud and
raucous" noises outweighed by privacy interests).
85. See Rowan, supra note 64.
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This right is regarded as a
fundamental constitutional right protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 153.
87. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11
(1975) (noting that the burden is ordinarily on the listener to avoid the
undesired speech).
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interests of an unwilling listener will prevail."8 In the latter
instance, whether the proposal impermissibly infringes on the
woman's right to choose depends on two primary considera-
tions: First, does the proposal require the provision of infor-
mation designed to persuade against exercising the abortion
option? 9 Second, does the proposal intrude upon the discre-
tion of the pregnant woman's physician?9 °
1) Unwilling Listeners. In protecting unwilling listeners
from unwanted speech, courts frequently determine the extent
of the privacy interest based on the location of the speaker and
listener. Speech which intrudes into a person's home or
mailbox can be -subjected to regulation. 91 Once a person
leaves the safety and tranquility of the home, however, they
assume a risk of confronting unwelcome stimuli.
In P. U.C. v. Pollack,9 2 for example, the Supreme Court
upheld the right of the D.C. Metropolitan Transportation
Authority to play music and advertisements on public buses,
despite the fact that some people found the practice offensive.
In Cohen v. California," the Court used the same reasoning in
overturning a disorderly conduct conviction given to a man
wearing a jacket in the county courthouse with "FUCK THE
DRAFT" embroidered on the back. In doing so, the argument
that the passersby constituted a "captive audience whose sensi-
bilities should be respected" was denied.9 4
As illustrated by Pollack and Cohen, once a person leaves
the home, the burden normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid
further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting
[his] eyes." 9 5 Still, there may be situations where the courts
may permit states to protect listeners who are not able to avoid
bombardment by unwanted speech.96 Even in these cases,
however, the unwilling listener can only be protected from the
88. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
89. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444
(1983).
90. Id. at 445.
91. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978)
(regulating the speech broadcast into one's home); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office
Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) (regulating speech circulated through the
mail).
92. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
93. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
94. Id. at 21.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Rockford, 585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978) (protecting the sensibilities of airline
passengers in line from religious solicitation).
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speech to the extent provided by state law. In order to protect
sensibilities and minimize restrictions on free expression, for
example, a state may elect to limit a speaker's proximity to a
listener in certain areas without prohibiting speech
altogether.97
2) Imposition on the Right to Choose. The Supreme Court
held in Roe v. Wade that the constitutional right to privacy
encompasses "a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy." 98 Furthermore, the Constitution requires that
the decision remain "free from unjustified government inter-
ference."9 9 The expressive activity by Operation Rescue par-
ticipants is designed to affect a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy. The critical inquiry, therefore,
is to determine if the proposal constitutes unjustified govern-
ment interference.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,l° ° the Supreme Court
held that a state requirement that a woman certify her consent
to an abortion in writing and that such consent be "informed
and freely given and not the result of coercion" was not an
unjustified state interference.' 0 ' The Court accepted the defi-
nition of "informed" as "the giving of information to the
patient as to just what would be done and as to its conse-
quences, 0 2 and further cautioned that "[t]o ascribe more
meaning than this might well confine the attending physician to
an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of
his profession."°103
97. See, e.g., BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 5-3-10 (1981 and Supp.
1987) (Harassment Near Health Care Facilities). The ordifiance here limits
the distance between a speaker and unconsenting listener to eight feet when
within 100 feet of a health care facility.
98. 410 U.S. at 153. Consequently, a woman has "at least an equal
right to choose to carry her fetus to term as to choose to abort it." Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977).
99. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
100. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
101. Id. at 65.
102. Id. at 67 n.8.
103. Id. It is interesting to observe that this cautionary note by the
Court tends to restrict the nature of the information given to the woman not
based on how it affects her decision, but rather on how it bears upon the
doctor's discretion. Placing such an emphasis on the doctor's role in the
decision, it has been argued, serves to undermine the woman's right as
affirmed in Roe. This emphasis also opens the door for paternalistic
limitations on the woman's right. See generally Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the
Physician in Abortion and Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical
Discretion, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 51 (1983).
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The clearest indication by the Court on the kind of infor-
mation which will be regarded as an unjustified governmental
interference is in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health.10 4
In Akron, an ordinance required the attending physician to
present a woman contemplating abortion with several catego-
ries of information.° 5 The Court invalidated the requirement
for two "equally decisive" reasons. 0 6 First, rather than provid-
ing the basis for a woman to make an informed decision, the
Court regarded the ordinance as being designed to "persuade
her to withhold [her consent] altogether."' °7 Second, the
Court expressed concern that the ordinance would be an
"intrusion upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's
physician."' 0
While Akron made clear that a state may not require infor-
mation calculated to dissuade a woman from choosing in favor
of an abortion as a prerequisite to undergoing the procedure,
the holding does not suggest that the state must therefore take
steps to suppress private parties from making such disclosures.
Indeed, state suppression in this regard would almost certainly
be invalid as a violation of the first amendment. Essentially, the
state's role with regard to the woman's right to choose and the
Operation Rescue participants' right to speak freely is that it
must maintain a neutral disposition: laws may neither require
full disclosure of information relevant to the abortion decision,
nor may they forbid it. The validity of the proposal depends on
whether it deviates impermissibly beyond absolute
neutrality.' 0 9
3. Balancing of Claims Favors Proposal
The discussion in the preceding subsection illustrates the
fact that neither the free speech interests of Operation Rescue
104. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
105. Id. at 442. The ordinance required the physician to disclose
information regarding the status of the pregnancy, the development of the
fetus, the date of possible viability, the physical and emotional consequences
of abortion, and the availability of agencies providing assistance and
information on birth control, adoption, and childbirth, as well as the risks
associated with her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be
employed. Id.
106. Id. at 444-45.
107. Id. at 444.
108. Id. at 445.
109. Based on the Supreme Court's holdings in Roe, Akron, and H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), the proposal does not exceed constitutional
limitations on a state's ability to affect the woman's right to choose an
abortion. See infra 1021-22.
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND ABORTION PROTESTS
participants, nor the property and privacy rights of the clinic
owners, nor the women's liberty interests in choosing an abor-
tion are absolute. Accommodating the Operation Rescue par-
ticipants' freedom of expression through the proposal may well
be within a state's authority, and prudence would also dictate
that a balance of the interests at stake favor the proposal. Rele-
vant inquiries include the purpose and effect of the trespass,
the public accessibility of the health-care facility, the impact on
the value of the property, and the extent to which the state
interferes with the abortion decision.
a. Purpose and Effect of the Entry
Granting Operation Rescue participants a qualified access
to private property is calculated to result in certain benefits to
society. The benefits derive from enabling Operation Rescue
participants (or anyone else) to provide information detailing
the pros and/or cons of abortion (or any practical health
choice) to persons so that a decision can be made on a more
fully informed basis." 0 Thus, permitting entry must be related
to an effort to inform. When the entry impedes the decision-
making process, such as an entry to persuade through harass-
ment or intimidation rather than information, the entry cannot
be justified. Consequently, the proposal only decriminalizes
entry which has the purpose and effect of giving informa-
tion. '' Access to private property in order to inform the pub-
lic is particularly necessary when the targeted audience has
limited means of obtaining the information. Courts have
upheld such access when the information to be provided was
necessary to check potential police abuses of power, 1 12 and
110. With choices regarding abortion, a full range of information is
particularly important. States are forbidden to require disclosures which may
dissuade someone from exercising a choice favoring abortion. Consequently,
it is reasonable to assume that a substantial number of women contemplating
the abortion option are considering much less than a full range of the
potential implications. The proposal permits this deficiency to be addressed.
See text, infra at 1028-29.
111. Examples of "harassment" and "intimidation," discussed in
Abortion Clinic Violence: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1st and 2nd
Sess. 1, 3, 23, 130 (1987), include chasing patients, screaming threats and
epithets, grabbing patients and staff, and shoving signs in the faces of women.
While behavior of this nature may include a marginal amount of informative
value, it would nevertheless fail to meet the proposal's criteria since the
informing aspects are secondary to coercive activity which is not privileged,
nor advocated by Operation Rescue. See generally Note, Too Close for Comfort:
Protesting Outside Medical Facilities, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1856 (1988).
112. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 604 (1980).
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make isolated migrant workers aware of their legal rights." 3 In
these circumstances, courts have recognized the benefits of
allowing access to private property where the purpose and
effect of their entry is to inform people about things which
affect the decision-making process. Still, these benefits must be
balanced against the interests which would be compromised by
facilitating access.
b. Public Accessibility of the Facility
One of the interests compromised by the proposal is the
privacy interest the owner of a clinic enjoys in being able to run
the facility as he or she sees fit. The extent of this interest,
however, will largely depend on whether the clinic is "private"
private property, or "public" private property." 4 This distinc-
tion recognizes that the greater the property is committed to
public use, the lesser the chance that permitting unconsented
access to persons providing relevant information will result in
"substantial privacy interests . . .being invaded in an essen-
tially intolerable manner.' '5 The fact that a property owner
operates a business that depends on the entry of the public to
prosper suggests that the privacy interest in the property is not
strong. " 
6
In the case of abortion clinics and Operation Rescue activ-
ity, the proposal would only permit access to clinics open to the
public, and only on the grounds apart from the inside of the
building. The need to conduct the operation of the clinic free
from interference and distractions suggests that the privacy
expectation inside the building is great enough to override any
grant of unconsented access within the clinic itself. The propo-
sal, however, would only convey a privilege on the outdoor
portion of the property, where the privacy interest is much
weaker.
113. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
114. "Public" private property generally refers to property which the
owner has voluntarily placed into the public realm by committing it to some
degree of public use. Owners of this kind of property must normally accept
the reasonable consequences of being publicly accessible. See Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 469 (1980). "Private" private property, such as a
residence, is property which is not committed to public use.
115. 403 U.S. at 21.
116. See Allen v. Combined Communications, 7 Media L. Rep. 2417
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 1981).
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c. Value of the Property Not Significantly Decreased
The test formulated by the Supreme Court in Pruneyard
calls for an examination of how substantially a state's promo-
tion of free speech impairs the value of the property
affected." 7  In Pruneyard, the Court emphasized that the
orderly solicitation of signatures for a petition at a private
shopping center would not "unreasonably impair the value or
use of [the] property as a shopping center." 8 In evaluating the
adverse impact of the free speech activity on the value of the
property, the Court focused its analysis on how significantly the
activity interfered with the intended use of the property, rather
than on a general inquiry into the amount of lost revenue
resulting from the speech.
The Pruneyard Court pointed out that the shopping center
was open to the public at large, and that state restrictions
requiring the expressive activity to be orderly and limited to
common areas were reasonable." 9 Clearly, the presence of an
organized group with their own agenda in front of a store may
dissuade shoppers from entering the store (although depend-
ing on the status of the group and the individual shopper, such
a presence may also encourage patronizing that particular
store), but for purposes of determining if the economic value
had been impaired enough to constitute a constitutional "tak-
ing," the Court concluded that the primary concern was the
store's ability to operate the business despite the unconsented
entry.
The activity permitted through the proposal, and its
impact on a clinic, is analogous to the effect on the property in
Pruneyard. The purpose of the clinic is to provide health care
services to the public. Where the service is provided exclu-
sively indoors, as with an abortion clinic, a law decriminalizing
certain trespasses only on the outdoors portion of the property
will have no impact on the clinic owners' ability to provide the
service. Although the proposal may enable groups to persuade
individuals from patronizing the health care facility, the facil-
ity's ability to operate is not economically impaired to the
extent that a constitutional "taking" has occurred.
d. Right to Choose Not Impernissibly Burdened
Although the Supreme Court in Akron prohibited a state
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they may have on the discretion of the physician,' 21 the core of
the abortion right is nevertheless a woman's freedom to decide
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.' 2' Since the pro-
posal is designed to provide a greater range of information
regarding health choices than is currently available from other
sources, the impact on a woman's abortion decision is clear. By
facilitating the provision of more comprehensive disclosures,
rather than requiring it, the proposal cannot be regarded as an
unjustified government interference pursuant to the reasoning
in Akron. Furthermore, the Court's decisions in H.L. v. Mathe-
son,' 22 and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,'22 held that a
state may take measures to encourage childbirth over abortion.
In Matheson, the Court held that a state may legitimately
pursue a policy favoring childbirth over abortion to the extent
of refusing to pay for abortions which women could not other-
wise afford. Writing for the majority in Matheson, Chief Justice
Burger stated that the Constitution "does not compel a state to
fine-tune its statutes so as to encourage or facilitate abor-
tions."' 2 14 In Webster, the Court restated this rule even more
explicitly by approving a Missouri statute which forbids the
expenditure of public funds or use of public facilities for the
purpose of performing abortion procedures. 2 1 So while the
Akron rule forbids a state from requiring private parties to dis-
courage the abortion option, the state may nevertheless with-
hold state services in order to discourage abortion pursuant to
the rationale in Matheson and Webster.
By withholding the state's ability to criminally sanction
trespasses designed to either encourage or discourage abor-
tion, or any other health choice, the proposal does not consti-
tute any more of an unjustified interference than the state
actions in Webster and Matheson. If, on the other hand, the pro-
posal decriminalized only the giving of information calculated
to discourage a woman from opting in favor of abortion, then
the proposal might constitute an unjustified state interference
as in Akron. By permitting trespass for the purpose of providing
120. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
121. See Jipping, Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refinement, 38 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 329, 363-72 (1988). Jipping argues that despite language in the
Court's abortion decisions suggesting that the woman's right is subject to, or
coextensive with, her physician's discretion, the physician possesses no
constitutional rights independent of the patient. See also Asaro, supra note
103.
122. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
123. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
124. 450 U.S. at 413.
125. 109 S. Ct. at 3042.
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"necessary" information, however, the proposal does not dis-
tinguish between information which either encourages or dis-
courages the person making the choice. In this regard, the
proposal is even less of an interference than in Webster and
Matheson, and is therefore presumptively valid.
B. The Proposal Is Consistent with Current Public Policy Objectives
The fact that a law is constitutionally permissible and con-
sistent with judicial reasoning does not necessarily mean that
such a law promotes public welfare enough to justify its enact-
ment. This proposal is premised on the idea that a fully
informed choice is better than a less than fully informed choice.
In the context of abortion, the fact that Akron prohibits.the state
from requiring health-care providers to fully inform patients
makes it reasonable to assume that some health choices are
made without a complete understanding of the implications
and alternatives.
When intelligent consumer decisions can only be made
with a full disclosure of the implications and alternatives, the
government frequently enacts legislation calling for disclosures
as a means of protecting the consumer. For example, in trans-
actions involving consumer credit,' 26 securities' 27 and insur-
ance,' 28 Congress has made laws premised on the idea that a
fully informed choice is better than a less than fully informed
choice. Furthermore, in the context of health care, courts have
similarly affirmed this idea in the area of wrongful birth
claims' 2 9 and cases involving the standard of care a physician
owes to a patient.' 30
1. Congressional Recognition of the Importance of Fully
Informed Choices
The Federal Truth in Lending Act'' illustrates one of the
clearest examples of a regulation designed to facilitate fully
informed choices, thus preventing the public from making
harmful decisions. The purpose of the Act is "to promote the
informed use of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about
its terms and costs. The regulation also gives consumers the
126. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1981).
127. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
(1982).
128. Federal HMO Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1973).
129. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986).
130. See, e.g., Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. 1971); Wilkinson v.
Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1981) (hereinafter, "the Act").
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right to cancel certain credit transactions . *.".., Similarly,
Rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 '33 facili-
tates more fully informed choices by requiring corporations to
disclose to investors information which is "material" to the sale
or purchase of securities.' 34 Finally, Congress promotes fully
informed choices with regard to health insurance through reg-
ulations which set minimum disclosure requirements for feder-
ally qualified Health Maintenance Organizations.'
35
With each of these sets of regulations, Congress made a
determination that consumers would be more inclined to make
harmful sales and purchases if the parties from whom they
bought and sold were free to withhold relevant information.
Consequently, Congress enacted disclosure regulations in
order to give the consumer a chance to make a truly informed
decision. Although the proposal does not go so far as to man-
date full disclosures' 36 regarding health choices, the effect
would be to make such disclosures somewhat easier. In this
regard, the proposal promotes the governmental objective of
making consumer decisions more fully informed without going
beyond constitutional limitations.
2. Judicial Recognition of the Importance of Fully Informed
Choices
In addition to legislative enactments, courts frequently
make rulings which suggest that a fully informed choice is more
worthy of protection than an uninformed choice. This is partic-
ularly true in cases dealing with wrongful birth claims. For
example, in Smith v. Cote,'3 7 a physician failed to discover that a
pregnant woman had rubella-a disease which, if exposed to
the fetus, could potentially result in birth defects-and thus
deprived the woman of information on which she would have
an abortion. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the
wrongful birth claim, stating that failure to disclose the infor-
mation and advise the parents of the abortion option was an
"invasion of the parental right to decide whether to avoid the
birth of a child with congenital defects."' 38 Such a result, the
Court reasoned was necessary to maintain the "interest in pre-
132. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (1981).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78A-78LLL (1982) (hereinafter "the 1934 Act").
134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
135. 42 C.F.R. § 417.236 (1990).
136. To do so would be impermissible according to the holding in
Akron. See supra at 1025-26.
137. 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986).
138. Id. at 348.
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serving personal autonomy, which may include the making of
informed reproductive choices."' 3 9 In his concurrence, Justice
Souter 140 suggested, without stating specifically, that physi-
cians morally opposed to abortion might avoid liability for fail-
ing to inform patients fully so long as such physicians make a
"timely referral to other physicians who are not so
constrained."'
4 '
In cases involving the standard of care a physician owes to
a patient, courts frequently rule that the more informed a
health choice can be, the better. In Cooper v. Roberts, the court
stated that a physician is bound to disclose "those risks which a
reasonable man would consider material to his decision
whether or not to undergo treatment."' 14 1 Similarly, in Miller v.
Kennedy, the court stated that "the scope of the duty to disclose
information.., is measured by the patients' need to know.'
'1 43
These rulings suggest an orientation, as with the legislative
enactments discussed above, focused on the patients' rights in
a consumer/contract style of health care providing. In the
same way, the proposal facilitates only the provision of relevant
information, while leaving the final decision in the hands of the
person making it.
C. The Proposal Is Neither Harmful Nor Morally Offensive
This section takes a detailed look at the Operation Rescue
situation, focusing on two issues: (1) the "justifiability'
'144 of
Operation Rescue civil disobedience and (2) the extent to
which the application of criminal trespass statutes to Operation
Rescue activities possess a foundation either in the harmfulness
or the offensiveness of the activities. We contend that the
application of criminal trespass statutes to Operation Rescue
activities lacks foundation on both counts. The proposal is
constructed with Operation Rescue activities in mind, but we
believe that any actions which fit its provisions will also be
actions concerning which the application of the criminal tres-
pass statute would lack foundation. Our goal, therefore, is to
recommend the equity of the proposal by showing that Opera-
tion Rescue activities, as an instance of an action which would be
139. Id.
140. Now an Associate Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court.
141. Id. at 355 (Souter, J., concurring).
142. 286 A.2d 647, 650-51 (Pa. 1971).
143. 522 P.2d 852, 860 (Wash. 1974).
144. For the precise sense in which acts of civil disobedience can be
justified, see supra at 1004-05.
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exempted by the proposal, are neither harmful nor offensive.
These two concerns must be treated separately.
1. Harmfulness
First consider the harmfulness of Operation Rescue activi-
ties.14 5 Calculating the harmfulness of any action is an inexact
process,14 6 but considerations can be presented in this case to
justify the conclusion that Operation Rescue activities are not
harmful when the relevant features and effects are taken into
account. It is useful to break the discussion into considerations
related to short-term and long-term harmfulness. In the short-
term, the parties adversely affected are the pregnant woman
and the owner of the clinic,' 47 and so these parties are consid-
ered first.
The harm which may be incurred by the clinic owner is the
loss of revenue should the pregnant woman choose not to carry
through with the procedure. The harm which may be incurred
by the pregnant woman (assuming that the Operation Rescue
participants act non-violently, as is their stated policy) amounts
to varying forms of mental distress' 48 in reaction to the
attempts by the Operation Rescue participants to provide
information they have reason to believe she lacks. To consider
the interplay of these factors, the situation can be divided into
five possible scenarios involving Operation Rescue activities
around a clinic.
First, no pregnant women approach the clinic. Second, a
pregnant woman open to receiving new information relevant to
her choice (either by decision or disposition) approaches the
145. At issue here is the harmfulness of Operation Rescue activities in
the absence of laws to the contrary, i.e. in a world in which the proposed
amendment had been adopted.
146. For a discussion of the difficulty of performing any utilitarian
calculation, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
147. Those concerned, as we are, that the fetus which the pregnant
woman is carrying is an interested party in this matter may be offended to
have harm or benefit to the fetus neglected in our calculations. If it were
universally agreed that harm to the fetus was a relevant issue here, we would
include it. It would make the calculations quite straightforward in favor of
the Operation Rescue activists. In the interest of showing the strength of our
position by defending it from weaker assumptions, we leave the fetus out.
148. Such as distress at being asked to reopen a "settled" matter or the
distress involved in re-evaluating the relevant considerations, especially in
the light of new information. Both of these would be effects that would be
justifiably said to be caused by the Operation Rescue activists. It is possible
that the pregnant woman might feel threatened, but this is not justifiably
charged to conscientious activists.
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clinic, but turns away because the information altered her
choice. Third, a pregnant woman similarly open to new infor-
mation approaches the clinic, but carries through with her
intention even after receiving the information. Fourth, a preg-
nant woman not open to receiving new information approaches
the clinic, but turns away, either: 1) because of the passive
obstacle presented by the Operation Rescue participants, or 2)
because she was nonetheless persuaded by the information.
Fifth, a pregnant woman not open to new information
approaches the clinic, and carries through with her intention
despite the efforts of the Operation Rescue participants.
The first scenario involves no harm to either a pregnant
woman or the owner of the clinic. It is included for complete-
ness and to show that in the absence of a pregnant woman
there is no harm involved in Operation Rescue activities. The
second and fourth scenarios involve financial loss to the owner
of the clinic, so in those instances Operation Rescue activities
would be harmful unless there is evidence that this harm is ade-
quately offset. The third and fifth scenarios involve no financial
loss (and in fact include financial benefit), and thus in these
instances the impact of the Operation Rescue participants'
presence is harmful only if there is harm to the pregnant
woman that exceeds the financial benefit to the owner.
The second and third scenarios involve the considerable
benefit to the pregnant woman of being given the opportunity
to make a more informed (and thus a more commendable)
choice in the matter. For this reason the third scenario
involves no significant harm. The second scenario is harmful
only if the benefit to the pregnant woman does not exceed the
harm by way of financial loss to the owner of the clinic, and
while this is comparing apples and oranges, it would be per-
verse to judge financial concerns to be of greater significance
than the pregnant woman's right and obligation to make as
informed a choice as she can. Consequently, the Operation
Rescue presence here cannot be definitively regarded as on
balance harmful.
The fourth and fifth scenarios are not as tractable as the
others because they involve the possibility that the Operation
Rescue presence produces unjustified distress on the part of
the pregnant woman. It should be noted that the distress that
is relevant to this analysis is distress which is likely to involve an
aversion on the pregnant woman's part to fulfilling her obliga-
tion to make as informed a choice as she can. This is not to say
that the harm involved is not real; it is only to say that it is harm
that is not completely the Operation Rescue participants' fault.
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The fourth scenario needs to be divided into two more
specific scenarios according to whether or not the pregnant
woman turns away for rational or less than rational reasons. In
the pregnant woman's turning away, it is evident that her prior
decision to pursue an abortion at that time was subjectively too
weak to carry the pregnant woman past all obstacles. But it
remains possible that the pregnant woman's decision was,
nonetheless, objectively strong, having been formed as the result
of a highly rational process of deliberation. While it is unlikely
that all decisions to pursue an abortion are made in a thor-
oughly rational manner, it will be sufficient to show that Opera-
tion Rescue activities are not harmful even on the assumption
of highly rational prior decisions. Interfering with less than
rational decisions can only be less harmful than interfering with
highly rational ones.
Suppose, then, that the pregnant woman, having made the
decision to pursue an abortion in a highly rational manner,
turns away from the health care facility for some irrational rea-
son connected with the presence of the Operation Rescue
activities. In this situation have the Operation Rescue activities
been productive of harm? There are two ways in which the
activities might be thought harmful: either by causing emo-
tional distress to the pregnant woman, or by causing a failure
of rationality on her part. It is likely that Operation Rescue
activities produce some emotional distress to the pregnant
woman, but so will any activity that touches on her decision.
And while some Operation Rescue activists may cause illegiti-
mate distress by engaging in activities explicitly proscribed by
Operation Rescue, our concern here is only Operation Rescue
activities as ideally conceived. Ideally conceived, Operation
Rescue activities produce emotional distress precisely as much
as any attempt to encourage the pregnant woman to forego an
abortion. Concerning the production of emotional distress,
Operation Rescue activities ideally conceived are no more
objectionable than public service announcements encouraging
adoption. If the emotional distress is sufficient to lead the
pregnant woman to turn away in spite of her firm and rational
conviction, then that distress cannot be completely attributed
to the Operation Rescue activities, i.e. it does not pose an objec-
tive threat to the woman's safety. Her distress is very real, but
the Operation Rescue activities are not themselves sufficient to
produce it.
A second potential source of harm in this scenario involv-
ing a pregnant woman who has made a prior highly rational
choice is the harm of causing a failure of rationality on the part
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of the pregnant woman: she may turn away for non-rational
reasons despite her prior resolve. (Regardless of the firmness
of the prior resolve, if the pregnant woman turns away for
rational reasons, the benefit of having made a more informed
choice outweighs the financial loss to the owner.) If the preg-
nant woman turns away for non-rational reasons, however, it is
not necessarily the case that there was a failure of rationality
(i.e. an irrational choice). A person acts irrationally only if she
fails to do what rationality requires. Since pursuing an abortion
is not rationally required, failure to pursue it (for whatever rea-
sons) will only involve choosing another course of action also
rationally permissible. While Operation Rescue activities may per-
suade the pregnant woman to pursue another course of action,
so long as that course is itself rationally permissible, there is no
harm for the reason of causing a failure of rationality. The
fourth scenario is clearly complex, but because the Operation
Rescue activities do not cause a failure of rationality and are
not sufficient for the production of emotional distress, the sce-
nario turns out to be too close to call: if the pregnant woman
turns away for rational reasons, the effect is marginally one of
benefit; if for less than rational reasons, the effect is marginally
one of harm.
In fairness, the fifth scenario is not too close to call and
involves uncompensated distress to the pregnant woman. It is
true that the pregnant woman continues to possess an obliga-
tion to make as informed a choice as is reasonably possible, but
still in this scenario the Operation Rescue presence contributes
to emotional distress without effectively causing a more
informed choice. Whatjudgment, then, can be rendered about
the harmfulness of Operation Rescue activities when these sce-
narios are taken together? After factoring the first scenario
out, we are left with the second scenario which involves
unmixed benefit, the fifth which involves uncompensated harm,
and the third and fourth which are too close to call with assur-
ance. The results appear to cancel each other out, if we assume
that the possibilities are equally likely. Given the assumption
that the possibilities are equally likely, the judgment must be
that on balance Operation Rescue activities, while not certainly
productive of benefit, are also not productive of harm either. If
this judgment is accepted, the application of the criminal tres-
pass statute to Operation Rescue activities fails to possess a
foundation in the short-term harmfulness of the action
prohibited.
Consideration of the long-term harmfulness of Operation
Rescue activities (if rendered legal by the proposal) is, while
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less certain of being comprehensive, more easily carried out.
Allowing the criminal trespass statute to be qualified in this
way, thus allowing Operation Rescue activities on private
health care facilities despite disapproval by the owner of the
property, may possibly contribute to a general disregard for
property rights. While this would be a grave harm to society in
general, it is both unlikely that it would occur and unreasona-
ble to think that the harm would be caused by the Operation
Rescue participants. If a disregard for property rights did
result, it would be the result of a mistaken or perverse under-
standing of the purpose and function of the proposal.
There is thus no compelling reason to think that Opera-
tion Rescue activities are productive of long-term harm, and
taken with the judgment above that such activities are not pro-
ductive of short-term harm, we conclude that Operation Res-
cue activities are not on balance harmful. If the application of
criminal statutes to Operation Rescue activities is to have foun-
dation, it must be based on an argument that Operation Rescue
activities are offensive based on all of the relevant considera-
tions, and it is this possibility to which we turn next.
2. Offensiveness
The analysis of the extent to which Operation Rescue
activities are offensive to human moral sensibilities 4 ' will be
conducted by considering two different methods: first, an intu-
itionist analysis, and second, a rationalist analysis. Our conclu-
sion is that neither method judges Operation Rescue activities
to be offensive, and we therefore find that the application of
criminal trespass statutes to Operation Rescue activities also
lacks the foundation it might have in the moral offensiveness of
the activities.
Consider first an Intuitionist analysis. We gave a general
account of the way this method is to be applied (recognition of
primafacie rights and duties together with a judgment about the
overriding or all-things-considered obligation) earlier, 5 ' but it
is necessary to begin with a brief defense of the usefulness of
the method and the problems that attend its application.
While there is an appealing algebraic' 5 ' character to con-
siderations about whether or not an action is on balance harm-
149. Hereinafter referred to as "offensiveness."
150. See supra at 999-1000.
151. Utilitarian calculations about the importance of consequences can
be made to look like a matter of tallying scores: harms v. benefits. This
score-keeping involves designating some common coin for commensurating
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ful, inquiries into an action's offensiveness that are based in
intuitions appear to be plagued with subjectivism. Granted,
what one person finds offensive another sometimes finds quite
pleasing, and there is often little hope of forcing an agreement;
but this is surely not always so. There are a number of actions
which are uniformly condemned. For example, nearly every-
one finds the unnecessary inflicting of pain to be offensive.
Those who do not find it offensive may in fact be immoveable
on the subject, but when this problem manifests itself in action,
they are punished by society. It should be noted that, when the
case is not complicated, humans usually agree about whether
the action in question is offensive, worthy of approval or of
neutral value, and if life were a series of simple cases it is likely
that we would be less likely to think of such judgments as
highly subjective.
Before considering the offensiveness involved in the Oper-
ation Rescue situation, it is important to note the pivotal role
which the description of an action plays in making the intu-
itional evaluation of complex cases (i.e. those cases in which
competing rights and obligations are involved). Actions are
evaluated only under a description; and in complex cases espe-
cially, the description will be partial: the evaluation will be
based on only a partial account of the phenomenon. Some par-
tial descriptions may be inadequate for such an evaluation
because they treat the part as the whole or are unwittingly
driven by prejudicial concerns. But not all partial descriptions
are inadequate. A partial description which focuses on one
aspect of the. situation while still taking account of the other
relevant parts of the whole may justifiably allow an evaluation
of the whole itself. Operation Rescue activities can be
described in many ways, and while there may be no purely
objective way to determine THE definitive description, it is pos-
sible to give reasons why some descriptions are more illuminat-
ing than others.
When individuals differ about the appropriate moral evalu-
ation of an action, usually they are evaluating the action under
different descriptions, and often agreeing on a description is
sufficient to settle the difference (since at root our moral sensi-
bilities are not all that different). For this reason, it is most
fruitful to focus on the description of Operation Rescue activi-
ties most appropriate for moral evaluation. We believe that a
"most illuminating" description exists in this context, but we
types of benefits and harms and then producing a final score, for example,
"harmful consequences defeat beneficial consequences 206 Hedons to 197."
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consider six candidate descriptions. (The probable moral reac-
tion/evaluation for each description is given in parentheses.)
(Dl) Operation Rescue activities are a case of conflict
between advocates of Pro-Choice views on abortion and
their opponents, Anti-Abortionists. (In this case, moral
reaction/evaluation will depend upon the evaluator's
antecedent views concerning that debate.)
(D2) Operation Rescue activities involve the violation of
the clinic operator's right to conduct legal business and
to dispose of her property as she sees fit; moreover, this
activity is detrimental to the financial success of the busi-
ness. (Under this description, Operation Rescue activi-
ties are offensive.)
(D3) Operation Rescue activities are an attempt to pre-
vent the pregnant woman from exercising the illegitimate
"right" to end another person's life. (It is at least non-
offensive and possibly praise worthy to oppose the exer-
cise of illegitimate rights.)
(D4) In Operation Rescue situations, one person (the
pregnant woman) is attempting to exercise a legal right
and others (Operation Rescue activists) are attempting to
prevent the exercise of a legal right. (It is offensive to
violate the rights of others.)
(D5) Operation Rescue activities are peaceful attempts
to exercise the legal right of self-expression in a way that
demonstrates the urgency of their concerns. (Free
expression is at least non-offensive.)
(D6) Operation Rescue activities involve the attempt by
some persons to offer potentially overlooked information
to an individual attempting to make a difficult moral deci-
sion; inconvenience to the proprietor and imposition on
the person deciding are not intentionally increased.
(Non-hostile, non-invasive attempts to provide assistance
in making difficult decisions is at least non-offensive. It is
the fulfillment of a moral obligation.152)
It is not difficult to imagine each of these descriptions being
used in an attempt to defend an evaluation of the offensiveness
of Operation Rescue activities, but there are identifiable diffi-
culties with all but the last of them.
The first description, Dl, treats the situation as if the only
issue involved was the broad social policy issue. It would be
just as illuminating to characterize a debate about the morality
of sport hunting as just a debate about the right to bear arms.
152. See supra at 1005-09.
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In both the sport hunting and the Operation Rescue cases the
larger social issue is not of central import, even if the situation
is part of the broader discussion of the issue and even though
the evaluator has much clearer convictions concerning it. A
Dl -based evaluation of the Operation Rescue phenomenon
appears to take an illegitimate short-cut.
If the right to dispose of ancillary business property were
even as inviolable as the right to dispose of private property, a
description such as D2 might be both adequate and decisive.
There is no question that Operation Rescue activities involve
some violation of this right, but as we have indicated above,1
5 3
this right admits of qualification and so cannot be the only con-
sideration. An evaluation based on D2 would needlessly allow
a part to stand for the whole.
The deficiency of D3 ought to be obvious, even if it is not
hard to imagine it being offered as a justification of Operation
Rescue activities (i.e. a reason to think such activities on bal-
ance not offensive). This is potentially both a misdescription
and a treatment of the whole by reference to a part. If this were
an adequate reason to find Operation Rescue activities non-
offensive, then a number of more invasive techniques might
also be held to be justifiable in pursuit of the end. It should be
made clear that finding Operation Rescue activities on balance
non-offensive does not imply that absolutely any other attempt
to dissuade a pregnant woman from submitting to an abortion
would also be non-offensive.
While it was easy to see why D1-D3 are not adequate,
choosing between D4, D5 and D6 is not quite as simple. Quite
a number of reasons could be given to favor each of these
descriptions, but there would be considerable overlap. For
instance, all three identify as a central concern the freedom of
the individuals in the conducting of their affairs. It should be
noted that only D6 characterizes the situation as involving the
freedom of both the activists and the pregnant woman. In fact,
given the gravity of our concerns about the protection of indi-
vidual freedom, descriptions that appear to factor out any
party's freedom should be held suspect. Inasmuch as we would
be hesitant to value freedom of expression even over freedom
to dispose of ancillary business property, we believe that
descriptions like D5 do not succeed at presenting the situation
in a way that makes Operation Rescue activities appear to be
non-offensive. Thus, the interesting choice turns out to be
between D4 and D6.
153. See supra at 1018-19.
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To be fair to D4 (and to make it as plausible as possible) it
is necessary to make it explicitly come to grips with the rights
of the activists:
(D4*) In Operation Rescue situations, one person (the
pregnant woman) is attempting to exercise a legal right
and others (Operation Rescue) are attempting to prevent
the exercise of a legal right by exercising their duty (and
therefore, right) to provide information essential to a
moral choice.
Now, however, the offensiveness of Operation Rescue activities
is not nearly as obvious. If such activities are still held to be
offensive based on this description, it appears that the evalu-
ator must think the mere exercise of a right must be applauded
and insulated regardless of the amount of information that the
individual exercising it possesses; that the exercise of a right in
ignorance is at least as valuable as a right exercised on the basis
of some approximation of complete information. This is a
highly questionable premise. Moreover, D4* (as well as D4)
appears to involve a misdescription in its indication that the
activists seek to prevent the exercise of a right. This is not at all
the case. What the "rescuers" hope to accomplish is that the
actual right will be exercised in a way that they believe to be
more felicitous to almost all concerned. The right involved is
not best described as "the right to an abortion;" rather it is
"the right to choose concerning an abortion." The "rescuers"
do not intend to prevent this right from being exercised; on the
contrary, this is precisely the right they wish to see exercised.
Our preference for D6 as an adequate description of the
situation, and especially our focusing on the freedom to pro-
vide information on tough choices, depends upon the convic-
tion that the right to make choices in general (the pregnant
woman's central right here) is ideally a right to make informed
choices, and in this connection the activities of the activists
work toward the ideal. It may rightly be pointed out that the
pregnant woman also has the right not to be harassed, but just
how that right factors in is not entirely obvious. In the hypo-
thetical example involving Smith and Jones,' 54 Smith certainly
possessed the right not be inconvenienced by someone
attempting to point out his mistake. But in such a situation the
offensiveness of a violation of this right to non-harassment will
depend largely upon the degree of inconvenience involved. If
Jones in the example given above had cut off Smith's hand to
prevent the mistake we would be offended; if the informer sim-
154. See supra at 1007-08
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ply snatched the chemicals away we might not, especially if
there wasn't time to explain that an error was being made.
Thus the offensiveness of a violation of the right to non-harass-
ment depends upon the degree of inconvenience, and in the
case of Operation Rescue activities we believe that the degree
of inconvenience to the pregnant woman is not sufficient to
render the activity offensive.
In the end the conflict of rights appears not to center on the
pregnant woman's right to choose an abortion. The activities
of Operation Rescue are compatible with the belief on the "res-
cuer's" part that she has such a right. Instead, the conflict is
between the pregnant woman's right to make an inconven-
ience-free choice no matter how ignorant and the "rescuer's"
right to provide information pertinent to the choice even if it
involves a small degree of inconvenience. Considering the
degree of inconvenience involved with Operation Rescue activ-
ities in conformity with the proposal, it seems hasty to consider
the pregnant woman's right (thus construed) to be of greater
import. Thus D6, with its emphasis upon the priority of
informed choices, presents what appears to be an adequate
description of the situation. On this description Operation
Rescue activities do not appear to be offensive, and thus there
is reason to believe that all things considered Operation Res-
cue activities are not offensive.
A Rationalist analysis like that described earlier 55 also
relies in part on the description under which the action is con-
sidered, since a decision must be made about the nature of the
principle upon which the action was based. Once that principle
has been identified, all that remains is to submit the principle
to the universalizability test: would we be willing to accept a
world in which everyone acted upon that principle? An affirma-
tive answer implies the judgment that actions based upon the
principle are not morally offensive.
The requirements provided by the proposed amendment
together with the considerations just given to favor D6 suggest
that the following is the appropriate principle to consider:
(P) I ought to act to provide informational assistance to
the pregnant woman and treat the rights relating to
informed moral choice as superior to rights relating to
the disposal of ancillary business property just in case the
requirements of the amendment are met (i.e. nonvi-
olence and with the choice in its extremity).
155. See supra at 1000-01.
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While this is a bit cumbersome it includes the salient details.
Our conviction that Operation Rescue activities are not offen-
sive according to this analysis relies upon the belief that the
universalized form of the principle is acceptable:
(UP) Everyone ought to act to provide informational
assistance to anyone in need of it and treat the rights
relating to informed moral choice as superior to rights
relating to the disposal of ancillary business property just
in case the requirements of the amendment are met.
We find UP to be acceptable because it amounts to the con-
junction of the'following two universal principles which we
believe we have shown to be acceptable:
(UPa) Everyone ought to act to provide informational
assistance to others in need of it, and
(UPb) The rights relating to informed moral choice are
more urgent (of greater import) than the rights relating
to the disposal of ancillary business property, at least
under the conditions stipulated by the amendment.
UPa is simply the moral principle derived in section I.C above,
and the acceptability of UPb is suggested by prior restrictions
placed on the right to the disposal of such property. 56 On the
Rationalist method, then, Operation Rescue activities are not
found to be offensive.
The conclusion of this section is that Operation Rescue
activities are neither on balance harmful nor offensive. Conse-
quently, application of the criminal trespass statute to Opera-
tion Rescue activities fails to possess the necessary moral
foundation.' 57 The proposed amendment is offered to remedy
this over-generalization in the present statute, i.e. to prevent
the statute from being applied without moral foundation.
Thus, the proposed amendment is both warranted and
beneficial.
V. CONCLUSION
Both ethical and legal considerations have been mar-
shalled to support two conclusions. First, that as the criminal
trespass statute is currently applied, Operation Rescue activi-
ties constitute "justifiable" instances of civil disobedience. Sec-
ond, the insufficient foundation for the application of the
156. See supra at 1018-19.
157. The same conclusion could be reached concerning any application
of the statute to actions which genuinely have UP as their motivating
principle, although an argument might be needed to show non-harmfulness
in those situations.
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statute in the Operation Rescue context indicates that amend-
ment to the criminal trespass statute is justified. Accordingly,
an amendment specifying the narrow range of actions for which
the statute lacks justified application has been offered which
would make the statute more sensitive to the rights related to
the making of an informed practical health choice.

